To what extent have investments in "high-tech" office and information technology capital "delivered" in terms of reducing costs and facilitating productivity growth? In this paper we report results of an exploratory effort examining relationships between investments in high-tech office and information technology capital (OF) and alternative industry performance measures such as labor and multifactor productivity, gross returns to capital, real ex post internal rates of return, and markups over variable costs.
INTRODUCTION
It is widely recognized that "high-tech" office and information (microelectronic chip) technology has enormous potential for achieving major cost savings, particularly with respect to labor. Whether in practice such potential benefits to increased labor and multifactor productivity have in fact been realized is not nearly as well-recorded.l Indeed, in an earlier paper based on a highly structured dynamic model of cost and production (Morrison-Berndt [1991] ), we obtained results suggesting that by 1986, in most two-digit US manufacturing industries, the marginal benefits of high-tech capital investments were less than marginal costs.
In this paper we report results of a much less structured approach, and thereby implicitly examine whether our earlier findings were simply due to our use of a highly structured, parameter-rich econometric model of production.
In particular, using a variety of traditional measures of economic performance and multiple regression analysis, we report results of an examination of the extent to which high-tech capital has "delivered" as promised in US manufacturing industries.
That a topic such as this is addressed in a volume honoring the intellectual achievements of Zvi Griliches on the occasion of his 60th birthday is most fitting. Zvi's research on the diffusion of hybrid corn in the US agriculture sector (Griliches [1958] ) pioneered in emphasizing the role of economic analysis in helping to understand the diffusion process --the supply, the rate of acceptance and the equilibrium usage of a new product. This paper follows on that paradigm --here we examine the cost and profitability effects of the diffusion of high-tech capital into US III
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-Page 2 -manufacturing industries. Moreover, throughout his distinguished research career, Zvi has emphasized the importance of measurement issues in undertaking and interpreting empirical research.2 As we shall see, measurement issues are particularly important in interpreting findings concerning the impacts of high-tech capital formation.
It is also the case that Zvi's research has often focused on the labor market implications of various forms of technical progress, e.g., capitalskill complementarity as a framework for understanding why rates of return to education did not decline in the face of substantial increases in the supply of educated workers. Whether in US industries the increased diffusion of high-tech capital affects workers with varying skills and occupations in a neutral or non-neutral manner is an equally important issue today. 3 Finally,
although Zvi has made numerous contributions to econometric theory and has employed the entire gamut of econometric tools in his empirical research, his research modus operandi has typically tended to favor the simpler rather than the more sophisiticated econometric artillery. In this paper, our econometric toolkit is a rather modest one --ordinary least squares and multiple regression analysis.
Our focus in this exploratory data analysis paper is on the relationship between high-tech capital formation and various annual measures of overall economic performance for two-digit US manufacturing industries, 1968-86. We concentrate on the manufacturing industries since these industries have experienced substantial productivity growth in the last decade. If high-tech capital formation has had positive productivity impacts, one could argue that these impacts are most likely to reveal themselves through an analysis of the successful manufacturing industries. It is worth noting that, although sales of high-tech capital in the US are much greater to the non-manufacturing and service sectors than to manufacturing, it is the non-manufacturing sectors that have fared worst in terms of productivity growth, perhaps due in part to notorious difficulties in reliably measuring their real output growth. 4 Hence, here we limit our attention to the relatively successful two-digit manufacturing industries.
II. Measurement and Data Issues
"Then the officers of the children of Israel came and cried unto Pharaoh, saying, Wherefore dealest thou thus with thy servants? There is no straw given unto thy servants, and they say to us, Make brick: and behold the servants are beaten; but the fault is in thine own people.
But he said, Ye are idle, ye are idle: Therefore ye say, Let us go and do sacrifice to the Lord.
Go therefore now, and work; for there shall no straw be given you, yet shall ye deliver the tale of bricks." For practical purposes, our possibilities are constrained considerably by the limited availability of public domain data, which at this point in time appears to be restricted to the data series constructed by John A. Gorman et al. [1985] and John Musgrave [1986] of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), U.S. Department of Commerce.
The interpretation of this BEA investment and capital stock data is somewhat problematic, since little documentation concerning data sources and data construction procedures is available. According to Gorman et al. [1985] and Musgrave [1986] , U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) annual investment expenditures by type of asset and by industry were allocated proportionally using two control totals. First, the BEA capital flow tables for 1963, 1967, 1972 and 1977 were employed so that asset types distributed to each industry summed to match industry investment control totals for equipment and for structures, where control totals were taken from the Census of Manufactures (1947 Manufactures ( , 1954 Manufactures ( , 1958 Manufactures ( , 1963 Manufactures ( , 1967 Manufactures ( , 1972 Manufactures ( and 1977 or the Annual Survey of Manufactures. 7 Second, the sum of investment types by asset category across industries was set to equal the corresponding annual national control totals used in the NIPA. Moreover, the equipment and structures control totals by industry were also adjusted to include capital expenditures by central administrative offices and auxiliaries, using data from the quinquennial Census Bureau publication, Enterprise Statistics. Other adjustments involved company vs. establishment units, a transformation from a use to an ownership basis, and from an input-output to a NIPA industry classification.
Based on this BEA investment and capital stock data, for each two-digit manufacturing industry we have constructed a "high tech" capital aggregate of office and information technology capital (hereafter, OF) as an implicit Divisia quantity index of four asset codes in the BEA data set: 14 --office, computing and accounting machinery (including computing and related machines, typewriters, scales and balances, and office machines not elsewhere classified); 16 --communications equipment; 25 --scientific and engineering instruments; and 26 --photocopy and related equipment. We have also constructed an equipment aggregate EQ consisting of all 24 components of non-OF producers' durable equipment, and a structures aggregate ST incorporating all 22 non-residential structure assets from the manufacturing industries.
The other set of data used in this paper is the annual output and input price and quantity data by two-digit manufacturing industry to 1986, provided us by Michael Harper of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data series on gross output Y, aggregate labor L (where hours are computed as a sum of production and non-production worker hours), aggregate energy input N, and non-energy intermediate materials M were constructed by BLS personnel using data from the Census of Manufactures and the Annual Survey of Manufactures.
The output and input deflators dealing with computers reflect adjustments for quality change incorporated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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It should also be emphasized that these L, N and M data refer only to inputs utilized at production establishments, and do not incorporate input , usage at the central administrative offices and auxiliaries of manufacturing firms. While this difference might affect the L, N and M measures, presumably the firm's measure of output is not materially affected by excluding central administrative offices and auxiliaries.
In terms of the L measure, attempts were made to obtain data based on the March CPS of households that asked respondents how many weeks they worked in the previous year, how many hours they worked in the survey week, what was their occupation and educational attainment, and in what industry did they do most of their work. In principle, such data should include hours estimates at the central administative offices and auxiliaries of manufacturing firms (hours excluded in the Census and ASM plant surveys), and also account for hours at work rather than hours paid for. Based on this data organized by Larry Rosenblum of the BLS, we had hoped to construct estimates of levels of hours by occupation, educational attainment, and industry. However, a preliminary data analysis suggested that this data, while perhaps appropriate for measuring the distribution of hours by industry, education and occupation, was not reliable for estimating the level of hours. For example, in four of the twenty industries (food, tobacco, apparel and miscellaneous manufacturing), simple correlations between the traditional BLS and this measure were negative, and in only four industries were the simple correlations greater than 0.8. For manufacturing in total, the simple correlation was 0.427. Given the uncertainties of the CPS-based data, we decided to retain the more "official" BLS data series on L constructed by Table 2 . As is seen in the first four columns of Table 2 , in all industries except petroleum and fabricated metals, the EQ share of total capital stock has been falling over the 1968-1986 time period. Similarly, in all industries except apparel, rubber and leather, the ST share of total capital stock has been decreasing as well. But in 19 of the 20 industries (the lone exception is leather), the OF share of the total capital stock has been increasing; by 1986, the OF share is greater than 60% in non-electric machinery, and is larger than 40% in the printing and publishing, clay and glass, and instrument industries. For manufacturing industries in total, the EQ share of capital stock fell from 59% in 1968 to 49% in 1986, for ST the share fell from 35% to 25%, but for OF it increased from 6% to 26%.
In brief, the investment and capital stock data indicate quite clearly that in almost all US manufacturing industries, not only has the aggregate capital-output ratio risen implying enhanced capital intensity, but the share of office and information technology equipment in the total capital stock has also increased dramatically since 1968.
We now turn to the labor data. In the first column of Table 3 , we tabulate the average annual growth rates (AAGR) of L over the 1968-86 time period, by industry. In thirteen industries, the AAGR is negative (the decline is greater than 2% in tobacco, leather, and primary metals), while in seven industries it is positive (larger than 1% in printng and publishing, rubber, and instruments). For manufacturing in total, the AAGR is -0.18%.
In the next four columns of Table 3 , we present measures of aggregate labor intensity (L divided by gross output Y) for 1968, 1976, 1981 and 1986, while in the last column we tabulate the AAGR of the L/Y ratio. Noting that growth in average labor productivity is the negative of growth in the L/Y ratio, we see that labor intensity declined (labor productivity increased) in all industries, with particularly large increases in labor productivity occurring in food, textiles, apparel, paper, chemicals, machinery, electric machinery and instruments. For total manufacturing, the AAGR of labor productivity was 2.08%.
With these data trends in mind, we now move on to a discussion of results obtained from regression analysis, in which we relate industry profitability, multifactor productivity and labor productivity to overall capital intensity and changes in its composition.
III. REGRESSION ANALYSIS
We begin by focusing on alternative indicators of profitability, and then analyze effects on multifactor and average labor productivity. Each of these alternative profitability measures is regressed on a constant term, aggregate capital intensity K/Y (where K is a Divisia index of the various types of capital), the ratio of OF capital to total capital stock (OF/K), the ratio of EQ capital to total capital stock (EQ/K), and a time trend term; all variables except time are in logarithmic form.
14 We begin with regressions by industry where the dependent variable is economic or total input profitability (revenue divided by total costs, or equivalently, the unit cost markup, defined as price over unit total cost).
Results from such "within industry" regressions, using annual 1968-86 data, are presented in Table 4 . As is shown in Table 4 , in most (15 of 20)
industries variations in aggregate capital intensity K/Y are positively correlated with economic profitability. However, in 13 of the 20 industries, the coefficient on OF/K is negative (often significant), implying that ceteris paribus, increases in the OF share of capital are correlated with decreases in industry economic profitability. A similar negative relationship occurs with the EQ ratio, and in fact this negative coefficient is typically larger in absolute value than the coefficient on OF/K. Finally, the estimated parameter on the time trend term is of mixed sign, being negative in 12 of the 20 industries, thereby reflecting the predominant negative trend in industry profitability over time.
As an alternative to these within industry regressions, we have with an R 2 of 0.838, where LUCMKP denotes the logarithm of the unit cost markup. Notice that when cross-sectional variation is included, the slope coefficients have signs that differ from the predominant trends in the within industry regressions. In particular, profitability is negatively correlated with aggregate capital intensity, it is positively correlated with the hightech intensity of the aggregate capital stock, and is positively correlated with EQ/K, although this last correlation is not statistically significant.
For completeness, we have also simply summed the various underlying variables across the two-digit industries to obtain total manufacturing measures, and then ran a regression using total manufacturing data. This Table 4 , which is not surprising given that this is also a "within industry" regression. Apparently, these within regressions attribute the declining profitability of industries over time to simultaneous increases in aggregate capital intensity and high rates of OF capital formation, thereby generating negative coefficients. The differing pooled results suggest that some of this correlation may be spurious, and that accounting for this spurious correlation, the partial effect of OF/K on profitability may be positive.
In Table 5 we report regressions based on our second measure of profitability --variable input or accounting profitability --defined as the ratio of revenue to variable (non-capital) costs, and interpreted alternatively as the markup over variable costs. In these regressions LREVVC (the logarithm of revenue over variable costs) is the dependent variable, and the regressors are the same as in the previous profitability equation.
As is seen in Table 5 Table 6 . There it is seen that, as expected given diminishing returns to capital, marginal increases in K/Y tend to reduce the average ex post internal rate of return (this occurs in 15 of 20 industries). The effect of OF/K is mixed, being negative in 13 and positive in 7 industries, and is seldomly significant. Changes in the EQ/K capital composition have a more consistent sign effect (negative in 16 industries), but parameter estimates vary sometimes rather wildly across industries. In summary, there is only a very limited amount of evidence suggesting that changes in the high-tech composition of aggregate capital (OF/K) are positively correlated with alternative indicators of profitability. This limited evidence emerges from the economic profitability (revenue over total cost) regressions, and occurs with pooled cross-section, time series data, rather than from the within-industry regressions. The predominant finding on profitability and high-tech capital is one of no significant relationship.
We now turn to multifactor productivity (MFP), another measure of industry performance. For each industry, we first compute the rate of MFP growth as the growth in output quantity minus the growth in aggregate input quantity, where aggregate input is a Divisia index of aggregate capital (with rental prices employing ex ante rates of return), labor, energy, and nonenergy materials. The resulting growth rates of MFP are cumulated over time, cumulated MFP growth is then exponentiated, and the resulting time series is normalized to unity in the first year of the sample (1968).
In Table 7 Table 12 .
This finding on the negative correlation between growth in OF/K and MFP is a provocative one, and opens up a number of issues. One perspective on this can be pursued by examining an alternative measure of productivity growth, that of average labor productivity, defined as Y/L. As noted in the previous section, labor intensity, defined as L/Y, is the reciprocal of average labor productivity.
In the next sub-section, therefore, we examine trends in aggregate labor intensity in greater detail.
IIIb. HIGH-TECH CAPITAL FORMATION, LABOR INTENSITY, AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY
Before presenting our empirical results on labor intensity and average labor productivity, we believe it is useful to digress briefly and provide some background about how one might interpret these regressions.
Suppose that one specified a Cobb-Douglas production function
where K* is a "quality-adjusted" measure of aggregate capital affected by the composition of high-tech office and automation equipment OF and non-high tech equipment EQ, such that
which in logarithmic form is written as
If high-tech capital is more productive per dollar of services than, say, other capital, then one would expect 6 to be positive. On the other hand, if OF capital (and EQ capital) do not have any differential impact, then 6 =--0. 
where
-(1l -P1)/P1, and a 5 -3 /P 1 .
Provided that i1 0 (according to the Cobb-Douglas model, it should be positive and less than one), a test of the null hypothesis that high-tech capital is no different in its productivity than other capital is a test of 6 -0, which in turn implies that a 3 in (4) We have estimated the aggregate labor intensity equation (4); results from the within-industry regressions are presented in Table 9 . We conclude, therefore, that based on these aggregate labor intensity regressions, the rapid accumulation of high-tech office and automation equipment capital has not been labor-saving, but instead is correlated with increases in labor intensity and decreases in average labor productivity.
Moreover, this finding is robust among the various time series and pooled cross-section, time series regressions.
In the final two tables of this paper we present results from log-log regressions without the Cobb-Douglas constant returns to scale and capital quality structural interpretations imposed. Specifically, in Table 10 in K is not included as a regressor, since all its components are separate regressors). As is seen in Table 10, However, it is of interest to note that while high-tech capital formation appears to have "delivered" in terms of one profitability measure --the unit cost markup (recall that the estimate on In (OF/K) remains positive and significant), it is in the two productivity equations that high-tech capital intensity appears consistently to have the most adverse impact. An intriguing hypothesis that emerges is that in these two productivity equations industry-specific output deflators are employed, and thus it is possible that errors in adjusting for quality change in the measurement of output lead to the apparent adverse impact of computerization on productivity. In our judgment, this measurement issue merits careful attention in future research.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our purpose in this paper has been to report results from an exploratory effort examining empirical relationships among investments in high-tech office and information technology capital and industry performance measures such as labor productivity, multifactor productivity, and various profitability measures.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. While limited evidence indicates a positive relationship between one measure of profitability and the high-tech intensity of industry capital stock, for both other measures of profitability the relationship is insignificantly different from zero.
However, for both measures of productivity (labor and multifactor productivity), there is a statistically significant negative relationship between productivity growth and the high-tech intensity of the capital stock.
All these findings are robust to the inclusion of lagged investment terms, suggesting that the results cannot be explained as simply reflecting the lagged effects of learning and gradual adjustment. It is also worth noting that the results suggesting adverse productivity impacts of high-tech capital intensity are based on data construction procedures involving use of industryspecific output deflators. Hence it is possible that the negative productivity results are due to measurement problems in failing to account properly for quality changes in the measurement of real output.
In placing our findings into context, it is useful to comment briefly on other related recent research. In a paper by J. Bradford DeLong and Lawrence H. Summers [1990] based on an international cross-section of country data, it is argued that social rates of return to equipment investment are greater than 30%, that the spillovers from equipment investment are very substantial, and that equipment investment has a highly beneficial impact on economic growth.
The DeLong-Summers data base does not permit them to separate high-tech from other equipment capital, a distinction that is central to this paper. More importantly, however, DeLong-Summers note that when the data sample is confined to high-productivity countries, the relationship between equipment investment and economic growth disappears, for the "identifying variance" in their regressions comes "...from a comparison of East Asia to South America" ([1990, p. 20] ).
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Note that the data in this study come from the twenty twodigit manufacturing industries of the US --all from a high-productivity country.
Finally, a related set of recent studies has examined the effects of computerization on the wage rates of employees. An intriguing finding reported by Alan Krueger [1991] is that employees whose work involves computers receive an approximate 15% wage premium over other workers, when controlling for education, age, experience and computer use at home.
Similarly, Ann P. Bartel and Frank R. Lichtenberg [1991] find that industries with relatively young or immature technologies pay higher wages to workers of given age and education than do industries with mature technologies.
Together these intriguing findings point to a mystery: What is it that these high-tech workers do, for which they are paid a premium, but does not seem to show up in measured output and productivity growth? That is indeed a fascinating issue, and pointing to this empirical puzzle is a most appropriate way of concluding a paper celebrating the 60th birthday of Zvi Griliches.
FOOTNOTES
1 For recent surveys, see Brynjolfsson [1991] , Wilson [1992] , and the references cited therein. Also see Bresnahan [1986] , Dudley-Lasserre [1989] , Jonscher [1987] , Morrison-Berndt [1991] , Parsons et al. [1990] and Osterman [1986] . The effects of a more general notion of high-tech capital are examined by Bregman, Fuss and Regev [1991] .
2 For a set of representative discussions, see Part I in Griliches [1988] .
3 Due to overall space and paper length constraints, in this paper we are not able to address the issue of the employment distribution impacts of high-tech capital formation; see, however, Berndt, Morrison and Rosenblum [1992] . 4 For a recent discussion of measurement issues, see Zvi Griliches [1992] . 8 As we understand it, the NIPA breakdown by asset type is based on domestic production, export and import data; direct data on investment by detailed asset type are not available for use in estimating asset-specific national investment.
90n this, see Cole et al. [1986] , Cartwright [1986] , and Berndt-Griliches [1990] .
1 0 For further discussion, see Berndt-Morrison [1992] .
11Discussion of rental price construction methods and references to appropriate BLS publications are found in Harper et al. [1989] .
1 2 In the BLS data base, the depreciation rates for each asset follow a hyperbolic pattern and are not necessarily constant over time; depreciation rates for the EQ, ST and OF composites also vary across industries and time due to changes in the composition of the stocks. In fact, however, the depreciation rates tend to be very stable over time for each asset. For 1986, the capital stock-weighted average depreciation rates for EQ in the machinery, chemicals and iron and steel industries are approximately 6, 8 and 6%, respectively, for ST they are all about 4%, and for OF the weighted-average depreciation rates for these three industries are 17, 15 and 14%, respectively.
1 3 The data series on the Producer Price Index is that for total finished goods, and is taken from the 1990 Economic Report of the President, This formulation of quality is closely related to that put forth in the education and labor context by Zvi Griliches [1970] .
18 For a related approach, see Pakes-Griliches [1984] . 19 Further, there is a considerable literature on the measurement of investment spillovers, much of it in the context of assessing social rates of return to research and development expenditures. More credible ways of measuring spillovers, as discussed in, for example, Griliches [1988, Part III) and Griliches [1991] , are not considered by DeLong-Summers. 
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in this table is defined as K'-EQ+ST+OF, where all are in The shares are defined accordingly. Notes: AAGR denotes average annual growth rate. L is the sum of production and nonproduction worker labor hours calculated by the BLS, using data from the Census and Annual Survey of Manufactures. 
